Despite the obscurity of many of the political issues in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), one motif stands out clearly -the struggle for mastery of the world's commerce between Britain and France 1 . This was a struggle which was to engage the two combatants in warfare with very little break until 1815. If the prize for victory in war was global commercial hegemony, perhaps the richest plum of all was the Spanish seaborne empire in the Americas. Yet the attitude of France to Spanish America was immensely complicated by two diverse considerations: on the one hand, France's natural economic interests would have been best served by a breakup of the closed mercantilist system of the Spanish empire; on the other, because France was in competition with England for the trade of the Indiesand England seemed to have been given a head start in this competition by the asiento provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 -France felt it necessary to preserve Spain's overseas possessions against encroachment from the English. This entailed a general strategy of increasing French trade through the channels permitted by Spanish officialdom and resisting all British attempts to prise open the Spanish empire by force of arms or illicit trade.
What was this system of Spanish trade with her American colonies which engendered so many conflicts? Spanish commercial policy in the Indies had a twofold aim: to keep foreigners out of Spanish America and to restrict all trade with the colonies to Spanish nationals. The second of these objectives was clearly the more difficult task. But it was not only foreigners who suffered from these restrictions. By the end of the seventeenth century Spanish mercantilism had become a serious obstacle to the development of colonial society. The whole system depended on growth in Spain's economy to parallel that in the colonies. But from the end of the sixteenth century Spain experienced a decline in manufacturing industries and was unable to absorb the expanding produce of the colonies. By the beginning of the eighteenth century Seville depended on foreign manufactures for four-fifths of its imports. So while Spain curtailed exports to keep domestic prices stable, the colonies languished for lack of manufactured goods; in 1735 the inhabitants of Spanish America were even forbidden to remit bullion to Spain to pay for exports to the Indies 3 . The prosperity of Spanish America now depended on the degree of illicit trade that could be carried on with the British. This was considerable in the period after the Treaty of Utrecht, since not only could Spain not prevent contraband and surreptitious trade under the cloak of the asiento, but it could not provide the most vestigial form of military defence against interlopers in the Americas. If there was a 'sick man of Europe' in the eighteenth century, it was Spain. The incompetence of Spanish administration was a general talking point throughout Europe. It is not too much to say that the Spanish empire survived in the eighteenth century on the sufferance of the French, who for their own purposes wished to sustain Spain as some kind of European power.
In an attempt to preserve this constricted trading pattern, the Spanish in the early 1700's tied shipping between the New World and the mother country to a dual convoy system. The rules obtaining in the early eighteenth century were formalised in the 1720 "Projecto para galeones y flotas"*. On fleet (the galleons) was to sail yearly to Portobello where the annual market took place. The galleons would sail first from Spain to Cartagena to await news of the arrival at Panama of the fleet from Peru. They would then proceed to Portobello to which the goods unloaded from the Peru fleet would be brought from Panama by mule. Merchandise from Spain would then be sold and the produce of South America embarked on the galleons for the 3 ) For a general survey of these problems see: J. The only other outlet for the exports of the Americas was Vera Cruz. Trade between Mexico and Spain was carried out through this port by the flota which sailed every two or three years from Spain via Puerto Rico. The principal wealth traded through Vera Cruz was the silks and spices of the Orient, conveyed by the Manila galleon on epic journeys across the North Pacific to Acapulco, where the cargo was transported by land to Vera Cruz. In the years when the flota did not sail lesser ships called azogues plied between Spain, Havana and Vera Cruz. It can be seen that Spanish trade was concentrated at relatively few points in the Caribbean, with a particular emphasis on Havana 6 . The convoy system was thus particularly vulnerable to Spain's enemies.
The same narrowness of trade was evinced at the European end. Ships could sail for the Americas only from Cadiz or Seville where the consulado (the guild of Andalucian traders) had a strict monopoly of trade with South America. By the 1740's other Cadiz/Seville based trading organisations had broken the consulado's monopoly in the Caribbean (including Venezuela); but its control was as strong as ever in South America proper. However, as a result of Spain's economic contraction this elaborate system came close to breakdown, even before hostilities with England in 1739. From 1715-36 only five fleets made the voyage to Portobello, and after 1736 the entire flota system was suspended for twenty years. The vacuum created by the disappearance of the convoys was filled by the register ships which thereafter took most of the lawful trade. These register ships could belong to citizens of any nation; by paying certain tariffs to the Cadiz/Seville monopoly they obtained the privilege of carrying goods to Spanish America. Although the vessels had to be freighted by the consulado, increasing quantities of French goods now began to reach the Spanish colonies. The Spanish were disposed to grant such privileges to French traders because of France's record in eschewing illicit trade. In the Caribbean French traders were under orders from their government to give bond not to undertake illicit trade; by contrast the English government never accepted that its shipping should be constrained in this way. At the same time Maurepas' promotion of the French East India Company (the Compagnie des Indes) created a favourable commercial climate within France. The result was that by 1740 France was enjoying unprecedented prosperity in foreign trade.
British resentment at French success in exploiting the legal possibilities of trade with Spanish America may well have played a part in the decision for war with Spain in 1739 7 . More obviously, the outbreak of hostilities was triggered by Spanish attempts (admittedly high-handed) to curtail illicit commerce between the British and Spanish America. However, the use of contraband as an entering wedge to prise open the Spanish empire had not been successful, and the asiento had from the British point of view been a total failure. It is likely, then that many in England felt that war with Spain was the only way to achieve their ends in the Americas. War with Spain meant war with France because the French could not permit England to conquer Spanish territory in the New World, or to open up the Spanish empire to its own commerce. Curiously, although Spain and England went to war in 1739, it was not until 1744 that France formally declared war on England -although the two rivals had engaged each other in encounters before this throughout the world.
The outbreak of war was undoubtedly welcomed by the French mercantile interests, who had been chafing about the gains made in Spanish America by Britain's illicit trade. Moreover, war destroyed many other lucrative inroads into Spanish commerce. The French consul in Madrid in 1738 had reported ruefully to Maurepas that English warships were securing high fees for the task of transporting South American treasure from Cadiz to other ports; in the consul's view this was something that French ships should really be doing 8 . Even more important, the traffic in cloth, the most important British export to Spain, Portugal and Latin America, ceased after hostilities commenced in 1739. France immediately took advantage of the situation and established new manufacturing centres in the Languedoc to fill this vacuum. At the same time Spanish reaction to war was to waive some of the more rigid rules in force for South American trade. After 1740 ships were allowed to sail round Cape Horn to Peru and to revictual and water at Buenos Aires (although this port remained closed to general traffic until 1778).
Maurepas had three major aims during the war, and these objectives were not significantly altered by the belligerent status of France. First, the supply of treasure to Spain from the mines of the Americas had to be kept up in order to allow Spain to maintain itself as some kind of European power. This was an affair of the greatest importance. Although revenues from the gold and silver mines in Peru and Mexico had declined severely since the great days of the sixteenth century (a French consul in Madrid in 1710 actually predicted the imminent evaporation of this source of wealth) these mines still provided Spain in 1739-40 with the equivalent of £ 4 1/4 million a year. Secondly, some way had to be found, involving French warships if necessary, to ensure that French commerce with Spanish America did not wither under the impact of the British navy. Thirdly, British attempts to cut off Spanish trade at its source by capturing the major commercial centres in the Caribbean had to be resisted. This was the reason for the despatch of the major naval expedition under the Marquis d'Antin to the West Indies in 1740-41®. Nevertheless, in the years before the formal declaration of war with England, France had to exercise a certain amount of circumspection in its policy towards its rival in Spanish America. On the outbreak of the conflict with Spain, the British requested that the French concede their right to navigate freely to and from their possessions in Spanish America. In a memoir to Maurepas on 5 August 1740 (N.S.) the intendant of the Navy M. d'Aubenton advised that this was a reasonable request and should be granted, provided that the privilege was not allowed to serve as a pretext for the extension of British shipping into waters where they had no possessions 10 . Such an infringement would clearly be against both French and Spanish interests and would interfere with trade out of Cadiz.
By 1741 French attitudes were hardening. The 1741 report on naval affairs prepared for Maurepas mentioned as principal grievances against the British in Spanish America: contraband commerce, seizure of French ships, false claims on several ports as open ports of call; and in the Caribbean false claims to St. Lucia and other islands 11 . Meanwhile the grave problem of how to effect shipments of gold and silver from the New World to Spain had to be solved. This was all the more difficult after the fall of Portobello in November 1739 11 . Whereas treasure from Mexico was unaffected since Vera Cruz was still in Spanish hands, the British possession of Portobello meant there was now no point in operating the traditional routing through Cartagena. Funds from Peruvian trade were detained in Quito in 1741 by the authorities, pending a resolution of the problem of how to get them to Spain. Maurepas' advisers counselled sending French ships to Cartagena and Vera Cruz in full secrecy. With the help of Spain the treasure could be brought back to Europe: on the return journey the ships should put into the first French port they came to; it was useless to proceed to Cadiz since this was under surveillance by the British navy 13 . Added impetus for such a scheme, which would need the closest Franco-Spanish cooperation came from the lobbying of French merchants in Cadiz. Some of these possessed funds in Mexico and Peru which they had been accumulating since about 1725. Alleging desperate need for the money they had stored up in the New World, the merchants pressed for the use of the warships of King Louis' navy, offering to provide the cargo ships for the purpose in return 14 .
Such a scheme was clearly possible only with the closest cooperation with Spain. The Spanish position was that they were as anxious as the French merchants for the return of treasure but were not in a position to do anything about it because all their ships were needed to protect Cadiz. At the same time the Spanish court was reluctant to give carte blanche to the French, lest their own interests be neglected. By 1743 the French merchants in Cadiz (whose situation was now critical as the war had effectively put a stop to normal trade with Spanish America) were desperate enough to commission two vessels unescorted by warships to bring home their funds. The ships were to leave Brest or Toulon in July 1743 with secret orders which were only to be opened by the ships' captains once they had cleared for the New World. Provided full secrecy was maintained, the ships should be in a position to return by January 1744 1S .
In the light of his department's exiguous resources, Maurepas could not do much to help them 16 . He instructed his officials to examine all possibilities for the reestablishment of French commerce with Spanish America in spite of the British navy. One of the more promising schemes floated by his advisers involved harnessing the entrepreneurial abilities of the mercantile sector to this end, so that the desperately underfinanced Ministry of Marine need make no monetary contribution 17 . French merchants interested in a high rate of profit could be prevailed on to provide the necessary armaments for a fleet of heavily armed merchantmen. The role of Maurepas's Ministry would be to secure Spanish consent to the scheme -no easy task, as was acknowledged. The ships would have to be armed in France, not Spain, and would have to return to French ports. Taxes due to the Spanish crown could be paid elsewhere and remitted to Spain.
Before these measures could be implemented, the decision for open war against England was taken at Versailles. This decision was the product of two main factors. One was a certain shift of emphasis to the colonial conflict and support for Spain in America against the English -and here we can discern the influence of Maurepas; the other was the increasing anger and apprehension felt by Louis XV about English intervention on the continent. Louis had even prepared a secret expedition to strike across the Channel and take England by surprise before any official declaration of war. When news of this invasion project leaked out and the English navy and Channel storms ended Louis' hopes of a quick coup, there no longer seemed any purpose in refraining from an open declaration of hostilities.
The advent of open war between England and France in March 1744 gave Maurepas reason to hope that a "colonial" policy (as opposed to embroilment in Europe) might eventually prevail in the Council of State since France would now inevitably be sucked into the Caribbean vortex. Moreover, the Second Family Compact between France and Spain in 1744 pledged the French to play a significant role in the Americas: among its provisions (alongside the usual pious hopes of wresting Minorca and Gibraltar from the English) were French help for driving the British colonists, brought out by General Oglethorpe, from Georgia, and greater privileges for France in the Cadiz trade.
Maurepas was now firmly committed to doing something for the French mercantile interest in Spain and Spanish America. The open entry of France into the war greatly increased the demands on British seapower and thus automatically improved the position of Spain in the Americas. With vital defensive actions to perform in the Channel and the Mediterranean, the English navy would be unable to do much in the Atlantic or the Caribbean 18 . This gave Maurepas his chance. As he saw it the most important first step was to get a substantial treasure shipment home to Spain. Although Spain's Havana squadron acquitted itself well in this war" and the English consist-ently took the view that Havana itself was too difficult to capture, the Spanish successes so far had been of a limited and defensive nature, as in the repulse of Vernon from Cartagena in 1741. Admiral Rodrigo de Torres had managed under extreme difficulties to bring a fleet into Santander in 1741 s0 , but the presence of the English navy in the Atlantic had made Spain afraid to repeat the venture. Now the Spanish, possibly feeling more confidence in their ally, at last bestirred themselves. A large fleet was prepared and despatched to the Caribbean under Torres to bring home the treasure of the Indies 21 . The plan was closely concerted with France: those principally involved in the operation were the Spanish Minister the Marquis de Ensenada, the Prince of Campo-Florido, Spanish ambassador to France,and Maurepas himself 22 . Some of Louis XV's smaller squadrons were sent to a rendezvous point in mid-Atlantic to escort Torres home. Amazingly the project went off without a hitch and Torres reached Ferrol safely in January 1745 with a treasure described as 8,274,565 piastres gourdes 23 . This was to be the most important Spanish operation of the war, since this was the only treasure fleet to reach Spain between 1741 and 1748; but for French assistance it is doubtful if Spain would have had the confidence to attempt it.
The return of Torres was certainly a boon for French merchants in Cadiz. Their importance in Spanish American trade can be realised from a report on the consequences of war with England drawn up for Maurepas by one of his favourite advisers, the shipowner M. Fournier, and dated 19 October 1745 24 . Fournier pointed out how serious curtailment of commerce with Spanish America was, since Frenchmen now owned two-thirds of all shipments from those parts. He had little good to say for Spain, which provided no protection for ships on the Indies trade yet demanded from them a high level of taxation. Taxes, said Fournier, should be regarded as a quid pro quo : either the Spanish should provide effective protection or they should accept a lower rate of taxation.
This memorandum is indicative of the antipathy felt towards Spain by French naval and mercantile sources by 1745. Although relations between the two powers were close during the war, there was an underlying uneasiw ) C. Fernández Duro, Armada Española desde la Unión de las reinas de Castilla y de Aragon, Madrid 1895 -1903 ness on both sides 25 . By March 1746 a top-level diplomatic mission under the Duc de Noailles had to visit Madrid to patch up the serious differences between the two allies. Many in France considered that their nation got a poor return for their protection of the Spanish empire. There were those who felt that France should press Spain to rescind its mercantilist system and open its American colonies to French commerce without let or hindrance. These merchants tended to subdivide into a "pragmatic" group which wanted to trade with anyone in the Americas, regardless of political constraints, and an overtly anti-Spanish group which considered Spain as much an obstacle to French prosperity as was England.
The pragmatic group is well exemplified by the French merchants in Cadiz, M, Duvelaer and M. Robion, who petitioned Maurepas in September 1743 for permission to outfit an expedition which would take trade goods to Peru and other Spanish settlements on the Pacific coast of South America 26 . Surprisingly, they had obtained the consent of the Spanish Minister the Marquis de la Ensenada but Maurepas' approval was needed also since French capital was involved and the plan entailed shipping English goods as part of the cargo. Maurepas' financial advisers urged him to approve the expedition on the machiavellian grounds that the project would be a flop anyway: six other French vessels had recently set sail for Peru and the market there was exhausted. Another syndicate formed by M. Le Duc and M. Taillapiedra had obtained permission from the Spanish court to ship English and French goods from Lisbon to Vera Cruz. This is an indication that Spain was prepared to waive its monopoly in favour of French merchants for the benefit of its American colonies, given its own wartime inability to supply the Americas.
This occasional generosity was not enough to satisfy the hard-headed anti-Spanish element in the mercantile lobby. A petition was transmitted in August 1743 to M. Philibert Orry, comptroller-general of finance, from the Rouen chamber of commerce 27 . The merchants of Rouen had attempted to secure permission from the Spanish court to introduce Rouen cloths into Spain and Spanish America. The request was denied on the (indefensible) grounds that cotton manufactured in France came from the Orient and might introduce plague germs into Spain. The merchants suggested that if French approval were given, they would send a secret agent to Madrid to distribute largesse in the right quaters, which they considered would obtain them the permission; all funds would of course be supplied by the Rouen chamber of commerce. This is a good indication of Spain's contemporary reputation for venality and corruption. There were other French trading interests who were not nearly so conciliatory and favoured the use of military force rather than bribery. Some groups were in favour of breaking the Spanish monopoly in South America by setting up in competition. In the winter of 1741 M. Rouzier de Jonquière, a St. Malo shipowner, suggested to Maurepas that the French establish a colony at the Camerones river on the southern coast of Patagonia 2 8 . A sum of 200,000 livres would be needed to set up an important trading post; the anticipated trade in silver with the Indians would be a threat to Buenos Aires and would provide employment for forty or fifty French ships. Maurepas was asked for assistance in outfitting two ships or else for the use of an armed vessel to claim the region. A similar scheme, aimed at a direct challenge to Spain in South America, was devised by a secretary in Maurepas' own ministry in 1746, making use of French consular reports from Spain 29 . The report established that every two years some 15,000,000 livres worth of French goods went to Spanish America. The king of Spain levied a high rate of duty on this, yet would not permit the entry into his domains of certain goods, such as cloth and lace, of which France was now the only possible supplier. On the other hand, Spanish authorities, particularly the viceroy in Peru, were vehemently opposed to contraband. In general French trade with South America, particularly on the Pacific coast, was subject to such restrictions as to be almost impossible. The only way to free France from the whims of Spain was to establish a rival colony in South America and the ideal spot for this was at Valdivia in Chile 30 . In the event of war with Spain over the breaking of her monopoly, Valdivia could also serve as a military base. The Indians in the area detested the Spanish but were on good terms with other Europeans, so the omens for a French colony were propitious.
It is a tribute to Maurepas' statesmanship that he rejected all such ideas and resisted all temptation to argue such points in the Council of State against the pro-Spanish ministers. By the end of the war events seemed to have justified the French low profile. Spain had been hurt by the war far 31 . On the other hand France steadily increased its share of Spanish American trade through the register ships. Although these were easily captured when encountered by the British navy, in the nature of things many got through safely. As for the British, although they took many prizes and dislocated the lawful trade of Spanish America, they did not succeed in their larger aims of opening the Spanish empire by force or defeating their principal trade rivals. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 gave the South Seas Company £ 100,000 in return for the surrender of the asiento. Naturally illicit trade went on as before but no longer under the cover of the asiento privileges.
The failure of the British to force or persuade Spain to allow direct trade with its colonies contrasted with the signal success gained by France in Spanish America during the years of the war of Austrian Succession. France stuck to the methods acceptable to the Spanish crown; goods for the Indies were consigned through the guild of merchants at Cadiz. The greater part of the trade to South America was in French hands by the end of the war. It was the steadily increasing share of the Spanish American trade which France enjoyed at the expense of the English, together with its augmented challenge in North America and the West Indies, which ensured that the conflict between the two nations would soon be renewed.
One further factor working to the advantage of France in these years may be noted. The military record of the British was not impressive in this war and after about 1741 they seemed to lose interest in this theatre of operations. Anson's epic circumnavigation of the globe in 1740-44 was originally designed to destroy the commerce of Chile, and to intercept the Manila galleon at Acapulco. Though Anson took a later Manila galleon in the Pacific and though his voyage remains a stunning feat of navigation, it achieved little from a military point of view 3 2 . The British lack of interest in Spanish America in the later stages of the war shows clearly that it was 31 ) It seems that in the very late stages of the war, and its aftermath, two more treasure fleets reached Spain, under Admiral Reggio in 1748 and again in 1749, both of which fetched Cadiz, (J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion, London 1971, p. 111) . In the period 1741-49, then, it appears that four treasure fleets reached Spain from the Indies (though Parry in his earlier work, The Spanish Seaborne Empire, states: "only one treasure fleet reached Spain . . . during the war", op. cit. p. 299). France, however, was only directly involved with Torres' 1744-45 enterprise.
32 ) ParTy suggests that if Anson had coordinated better with Vernon, they might have established "an English toll booth on the old silver route to Peru", (Trade and Dominion, p. 111).
not just the French who suffered in this conflict from an inability to concentrate on a single objective 33 .
